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From Euclidean Geometry to knots and 
nets1 
Abstract: this paper assumes the success of arguments against the view that 
informal mathematical proofs secure rational conviction in virtue of their 
relations with corresponding formal derivations.  This assumption entails a need 
for an alternative account of the logic of informal mathematical proofs.  
Following examination of case studies by Manders, De Toffoli & Giardino, 
Leitgeb, Feferman and others, this paper proposes a framework for analysing 
those informal proofs that appeal to the perception or modification of diagrams 
or to the inspection or imaginative manipulation of mental models of 
mathematical phenomena.  Proofs relying on diagrams can be rigorous if a) it is 
easy to draw a diagram that shares or otherwise indicates the structure of the 
mathematical object b) the information thus displayed is not metrical and c) it is 
possible to put the inferences into systematic mathematical relation with other 
mathematical inferential practices.  Proofs that appeal to mental models can be 
rigorous if the mental models can be externalised as diagrammatic practice that 
satisfies these three conditions.   
*** 
At the end of his (2012), Solomon Feferman commits himself to a formalisability thesis 
about mathematical proofs that he characterises as follows:  
...the Formalizability Thesis should be given a very strict reading, namely that 
(i) every good proof has an underlying logical structure, (ii) that structure is 
completely analyzed in the derivation that formalizes the proof, and, finally 
(iii) that derivation assures the correctness of the theorem proved on the basis 
of the background assumptions expressed by the axioms and rules of the system 
in which the proof is formalized. 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to conference audiences in Oxford, Paris, Nancy and Brussels for their patience and 
penetrating questions.  Much of the work on this paper took place during my year as a visiting professor 
at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and I am grateful to the directors and participants of the Strategic 
Research Project on Logic and Philosophy of Mathematical Practices at VUB for their material and 
intellectual support.  Valeria Giordino, Silvia de Toffoli, Irina Starikova and three anonymous referees read 
drafts and made helpful comments.   
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There is an argument against ii) that is already well rehearsed in mathematicians’ 
memoires2 and the philosophy of mathematical practice literature.3  Briefly, the case is 
that for many, perhaps most good proofs, there is no such thing as the “derivation that 
formalizes the proof” (because several quite different formalisations may be possible, or 
there may not even be a “derivation that formalizes the proof” because the proof resists 
formalisation for reasons described in the detail of the literature (see notes 2 and 3).  
This paper will assume the success of those arguments and therefore take Feferman’s ii) 
to be false.  If ii) is false then so is iii).  But what about i)?  We might be tempted to 
abandon it, too, perhaps under the influence of a view such as this:  
...there is, strictly, no such thing as mathematical proof; ...we can, in the last 
analysis, do nothing but point; ...proofs are what Littlewood and I call gas, 
rhetorical flourishes designed to affect psychology, pictures on the board in the 
lecture, devices to stimulate the imagination of pupils.4   
Adopting such a view would solve many problems at a stroke, at the cost of introducing 
the new challenge of explaining the error of all those philosophers and mathematicians 
who think that proofs are more than gas, and that proofs have something to do with the 
reliability of mathematical knowledge.  This paper will not take that route.   
Rather, we will keep a version of Feferman’s i) while denying his ii) and iii).  We then 
have to say something about the underlying structures of proofs.  Evidently 
(remembering the arguments against Feferman’s ii)), this view of such underlying 
structures must allow for all sorts of inferences, not only those that can be rendered in a 
formal system without distortion.  In this paper, we will assume a version of Feferman’s 
i) in which ‘logical structure’ is understood broadly to include mathematical inferences 
of any sort, including those that cannot be modelled in formal logic without serious 
distortion.5   
                                                 
2 See for example Manin (1981); Van Bendegem (1988, 1990), who uses this thought as a motivation for 
philosophy of mathematical practice; Hersh (1997); Rav (1999) on the mathematical interest of topic-
specific proof ideas and (2007); Robinson (2000) to make room for the explanatory function of some 
proofs; Thurston (2006: 48); Auslander (2008); Pelc (2009) to argue the irrelevance of derivations to 
mathematicians’ confidence in theorems; Hales (2012: x).   
3 Lakatos (1976) predates the formation of the philosophy of mathematical practice as a field.  Azzouni 
(2004, 2009, 2013), Detlefsen (2008), Buldt, Löwe & Müller (2008), Goethe & Friend (2010), Larvor 
(2012a, 2012b, 2016), Leitgeb (2009) seeking to rehabilitate Gödel’s allusions to mathematical perception, 
Macbeth (2015) and Tanswell (2015) all problematise the logical relation between derivations and proofs.  
For Avigad (2008:306), the difference between derivations and real proofs is the background for reflection 
on the growing use of computers in mathematics.   
4 Hardy (1929) p. 18. 
5 This broadening of the conception of logic has some affinity with the heterogeneous logic project of 
Barwise and Etchemendy, as Shin explained it, “… the heterogeneous logic project aims to expand the 
territory of logic...  Logic is not inherently tied up with sentential representation only.”  (Shin, S.-J. (2004: 
93). 
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We therefore require an account of the rational grounds for mathematicians’ 
acceptance of proofs that does not appeal to parts (ii) and (iii) of Feferman’s 
formalizability thesis.  However, for the most part, the discussions in the literature do 
little to suggest how such an account might go.  Some of the writers canvassed here 
refer to mathematicians’ understanding6 —the idea is that by working through the 
proof, the mathematician comes to understand that the conclusion is true (even if the 
proof is not explanatory).  This points to an important feature of mathematical proofs—
that in working through a proof, the reader engages in the same sort of activity as the 
writer (namely, mathematics).7  This may mark an important difference between 
mathematics and other kinds of scientific research and scholarship, in which a 
publication is often a report of activity carried out by the writer but not reproduced or 
re-enacted by the reader (a physical experiment or an archaeological dig, for example).  
However, this thought alone cannot answer the need, because all sorts of mathematical 
activities induce insight aside from proofs.  For example, calculating some notable cases 
of a general hypothesis might induce an aha!-moment, but such calculations do not 
constitute proof.  In any case, a mere feeling of insight has no logical standing in even 
the broadest conception of mathematical proof.  For a proof rationally to convince a 
mathematician, the mathematician certainly must understand the proof.  But what is 
understood?8  How is this understanding different from the understanding that experts 
in other disciplines have of the arguments they read?  An historian may read a research 
paper in history with understanding and thereby gain a feeling of insight, but the 
conclusion of the paper will not have the epistemic security of a mathematical theorem 
(even if the historian finds it utterly convincing).  Similar remarks apply to (nevertheless 
interesting and relevant) discussions of mathematical skill, such as Löwe and Müller 
(2010).  What is it about the activity in which the mathematician is skilful, that secures 
mathematical standards of rational conviction?   
                                                 
 
6 Feferman, in the (2012) article already quoted, argues that diagrams persist in mathematics because 
they are essential to human understanding of proofs.  Suppose this is true; this suggests the possibility of 
giving an account of the argument-structure of the picture-proofs that he considers without analysing 
away the inferential role of the pictures.  Such an account would contradict Feferman’s position, as 
quoted here. 
7 This remains true in the case computer proofs, so long as by ‘writer’ we mean the programmer rather 
than the machine.  Note, the reader and author of a proof need not engage in precisely the same 
activities because they may take different routes from one stage to another.  One might have to work out 
in detail some sub-result that the other can see immediately as a special case of some more powerful 
lemma already known, for example.  (I came to appreciate this point after hearing Yacin Hamami make it 
on the occasion of his doctoral defence.)  
8 As Pollard put it in his review of Hersh (2014), “The real question is how the arguments [in mathematical 
proofs] manage to present the experts with a mathematical grade of evidence.” (2014:273)  
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To answer this question, we need a model (or more likely, a family of models9) of 
mathematical proof to account for the epistemic power of mathematical argument 
without appealing to derivations in formal systems, and without simply saying that 
mathematicians can prove theorems because mathematicians have inferential powers.   
The Euclidean Diagram  
Fortunately, we do not have to build such a model from nothing.  We already have an 
account of one kind of mathematical proof that explains how such proofs guide and 
constrain the mathematical activity of the reader so as to secure rational grounds for 
their theorems.  This account appeals only to elements present on the page and to 
operations on those elements licensed by the mathematical practice in question.  There 
is no reference to a strictly formal deduction that might in principle be given but never 
is.  This account is Kenneth Manders’ analysis of Euclidean plane geometry (2008b).  Our 
question, then, is whether the model in Manders’ paper, ‘The Euclidean Diagram’, offers 
any help with understanding how present-day proofs do their logical work.   
‘The Euclidean Diagram’ is solely concerned with ancient plane geometry, and one 
might wonder whether it is both too ancient and too planar-geometrical to be of 
interest, since proof-practices have changed since Euclid’s day and diagrams now rarely 
occur in published proofs, except as illustrations or for heuristic purposes.10  Manders 
himself insists on the value of, “focus on one definite, cogent reasoning practice” 
(2008a p. 75).  Nevertheless, he also says that, 
Euclidean diagram use forces us to confront mathematical demonstrative 
practice, in a much richer form than is implicit in the notions of mathematical 
theory and formal proof on which so much recent work in the philosophy of 
mathematics is based; and to confront rigorous demonstrative use of non-
propositional representation.  The philosophical opportunities are 
extraordinary.11   
So it seems that Manders sees in this case-study the potential to challenge the terms of 
‘much’ recent work in philosophy of mathematics, and his phrase ‘rigorous 
demonstrative use of non-propositional representation’ is sufficiently broad to include  
inferential practices other than the use of Euclidean diagrams.  This is the possibility that 
the present paper sets out to explore.  Ideally, we would like to find cases in research 
mathematics from the 20th century, after the emergence of mathematical logic and set 
theory.  Otherwise, our speculative attempt to extend Manders’ approach would be 
vulnerable to the objection that the mathematicians in our case-studies employed “non-
                                                 
9 Recall Wittgenstein’s remark that “mathematics is a MOTLEY [BUNTES Gemisch] of techniques of proof”.  
(RFM III 46:176).  Given this variety, we should not insist on seeking a single model to account for all 
mathematical inferences.   
10 See Carter 2010 
11 (2008a) p. 69.  ‘Recent’ here means ‘recent in the mid-1990s’, the time of writing.   
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propositional representation” in their “mathematical demonstrative practice” just 
because “the notions of mathematical theory and formal proof on which so much recent 
work in the philosophy of mathematics is based” were not then available.   
In the companion piece to ‘The Euclidean Diagram’ in Paolo Mancosu’s volume (2008a), 
Manders gestures at some ‘Tasks for the future’ (pp. 75-8).  These are mostly confined 
to ancient geometry.  However, he mentions (p. 76) his work on Descartes’ analytic 
geometry, which takes us into a wider and more recent mathematical world that 
includes symbolic-algebraic reasoning as well as reasoning with diagrams.  Manders’ 
work on Descartes is set out in a paper that he wrote in the 1990s, ‘Euclid or Descartes? 
Representation and Responsiveness’, that remains as yet unpublished but which has 
circulated informally.  In this paper, Manders analyses the way Descartes took problems 
in traditional plane geometry, converted them into his newly invented symbolic algebra, 
solved the relevant equations and then returned to the traditional practice in order to 
determine which of the algebraic solutions answers the original question.  In the body of 
this unpublished paper, Manders develops an analytical apparatus that he then applies 
to the case of Descartes’ treatment of ancient geometrical problems, but which is 
sufficiently general to be applied elsewhere.  In the preamble to this analysis, Manders 
writes,  
Philosophers are now faced with the conceptual agility of 20th-century 
mathematics: hopping a functor to another category any time superfluous 
details are sensed (homology groups in topology); bringing in details seemingly 
extraneous to one’s question by a representing functor (group representations in 
the theory of abstract groups); explaining families of simple number-theoretic 
facts anyone can see one-by-one, by some hard to master “underlying” abstract 
structure (Fermat’s problem).12 
This remark, together with the general articulation of the analytical apparatus, suggests 
that the possibility of extending his analysis to present-day mathematics has occurred to 
Manders, even though this ambition is nowhere explicitly stated.  Much of the work of 
this unpublished paper is to explain in one, historically early case, how it is possible to 
move between quite different proof-practices without violating the specific rigour of 
either—in other words, to understand in a relatively simple case the conceptual agility 
just described.  This ‘conceptual agility’ will be important for what follows.   
The plan of this paper is first to examine ‘The Euclidean Diagram’ with a view to 
extracting ideas that might be brought to bear on contemporary mathematics—this 
supplies five questions to take forward to further cases; second, to consider existing 
case-studies that might prima facie be thought to analyse modern mathematics in 
something like the spirit of ‘The Euclidean Diagram’, and ask the five questions about 
                                                 
12 Though this paper is unpublished, it is a developed piece of work and benefits from two decades of 
refinement.  We may therefore treat it as a reasonably reliable expression of Manders’ view.    
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them; and third, to argue that appeals to diagrams (and by extension, mental models) in 
proofs may be rigorous, provided that: 
a) it is easy to draw a diagram that shares or otherwise indicates the structure 
of the mathematical object;  
b) the information thus displayed is not metrical; and  
c) it is possible to put the inferences into systematic mathematical relation with 
other mathematical inferential practices. 
Obviously, these three general conditions do not guarantee the validity of proofs.  Our 
hypothesis is that these are the principal conditions that the relevant diagrammatic 
proof-practice must satisfy for the question of the validity of a diagrammatic proof to 
arise at all.  We do not claim that these three conditions are jointly sufficient for a 
diagrammatic proof-practice to be in good logical order—there may be others as yet 
unidentified.  Nevertheless these three are a significant step in the direction of a 
sufficient conjunction of conditions.  As we shall see, Euclid I-IV satisfies these three 
conditions a-c.   
Logical features of the Euclidean Diagram 
The plane geometry of the first four books of Euclid is the usual first port of call in 
discussions of proof-practices that are not fully analysable into logical inferences coded 
in formal logic.  This is for the good reason that here we find a body of mathematics 
organised logically, in the sense that it starts with definitions and postulates and is built 
up by proofs, but its proofs cannot be fully analysed without distortion using a formal 
logic of propositions because operations on diagrams play an essential role in the 
proofs.  The core of Manders’ (2008b) analysis is his distinction between exact and co-
exact information found in diagrams.  Exact information is such matters as equality of 
lengths and angles, proportions, parallelism and curvature.  Co-exact information is 
things like the inclusion of one area inside another or the existence of an intersection of 
lines.  Exact information is vulnerable to deformations of the diagram resulting from 
careless drawing (the tomato-shaped circle or the triangle with curved sides), or 
accidental features such as a general triangle being drawn to look isosceles.  Co-exact 
information is not so vulnerable, and the vital point is that when Euclid’s proofs take 
information from a diagram, the information they take is always co-exact.  That is how it 
is possible to make good arguments on bad drawings, and how it is possible to draw 
general conclusions from particular diagrams. 
Manders’ work on Euclid is well known, so I shall not elaborate it further but will make 
five unoriginal observations that have a bearing on the argument of the rest of the 
paper.   
First, these proofs consist of diagrams with text and they rely on inferences in the text 
as well as co-exact information taken from the diagram.   These are not proofs without 
words; nor are they discursive proofs with illustrations.  Rather, the diagram and the 
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text work together.  There is typically a constructive phase, when the diagram is built up 
using moves that are either specified in the postulates or have been shown to be valid in 
earlier proofs.  Then, co-exact information is read from it and fed into a textual 
argument.  With an eye on case-studies later in this paper drawn from knot theory and 
low dimensional topology, it’s worth noting that these changes to the Euclidean diagram 
are constructions, not manipulations. 
Second, these constructive moves (adding lines or circles to the diagram) are inferential 
actions.13  They are strictly controlled by the first three postulates—nothing else is 
permitted.14  We start with some conditions, which we realise in a diagram.  We then do 
something (carry out permitted constructions of lines and/or circles), at the end of 
which we have some more information, and the information we gain is reliable because 
the activity was governed by rules that ensure that it will not lead us astray (these rules 
are the postulates plus the restriction to reading off co-exact information).  This rigour is 
why ancient geometry is reliable (Manders puts it more trenchantly, “Euclid… Apollonius 
and Archimedes are virtually without error” 2008a p. 67).  This yields a criterion for 
evaluating other candidate-cases of non-propositional inferential actions.  Namely, it 
should be possible to do for such a candidate what Manders did for the plane geometry 
in Euclid, that is, specify the implicit rules that render the practice rigorous as 
mathematical proof.  The claim of the present paper (that such practices should be 
public, non-metric and systematically relatable to other mathematics) is a step in this 
direction.  To quote Manders again, “At its most basic, a mathematical practice is a 
structure for cooperative effort in control of self and life.”  (2008b p. 82, emphasis in 
original).  In looking for more of the same, we should look for shared proof-practices 
governed by rules that ensure reliable results—not every napkin-diagram or thought-
experiment will qualify.  This is a (defeasible) reason for considering published proofs 
rather than spontaneous mathematical expressions.  Moreover, the language in Euclid is 
                                                 
13 I have elaborated and defended the notion of inferential actions in Larvor (2012a).  An inferential 
action is anything one might do that contributes to the logic of an argument.  Such actions  include 
speech-acts, manipulations of matter (such as physical experiments), taking of measurements, 
manipulation of physical or digital models, calculations, operations on propositions (such as applications 
of logical rules like modus ponens), bodily performances and in mathematics, a host of topic-specific 
moves in the sense of Rav (1999).  Proofs are full of imperatives that instruct the reader to build, change, 
move, identify or otherise re-order all sorts of objects, including but not only, propositions.  What matters 
is that such actions be governed by (explicit or implicit) norms.  If the aim of logic is to understand the 
difference between valid and invalid inferences, then these actions fall within its scope, even though we 
then lose any prospect of a single unifying theory of logic.  Since formal mathematical logic already 
includes a multitude of systems with varying symbolisms and logical strengths, with extensions designed 
for the analysis of modal, temporal and deontic arguments, this is no great loss.   
14 With the exception of Elements I.4, where a triangle is rigidly displaced.  This is well known to 
commentators (see, e.g. Ferreirós 2016 p. 130n20, or Russell 1902, who calls superposition “a tissue of 
nonsense”).  Euclid seems to have wished to avoid superposition wherever possible.  In any case, 
superposition is still a highly disciplined move, even if it does not fit the constraints of Euclid’s overall 
practice.   
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very restricted and formulaic, because the permissible actions have been reduced to a 
small and standard list.   
Third, traduttore traditore!15  Goethe is said to have observed that, “mathematicians are 
like Frenchmen; if one speaks to them they translate it into their own language, and 
then it will be very soon something entirely different.”  Discounting for xenophobia and 
hyperbole, Goethe was right.  Mathematical analysis of some natural or social 
phenomenon requires abstraction, the discarding of myriad details and it (usually) also 
requires a systematic notation or representation that facilitates the analysis together 
with conventions to make the notation work.  The point for the present purpose is that 
this is also true within mathematics.  When a problem or a question is translated from 
one mathematical idiom to another (or—what can come to the same thing—shifted into 
a new domain), it becomes something different while (hopefully) retaining whatever 
structure it is that we hope to understand.  To continue the quotation from Manders, 
speaking of the giants of ancient Greek mathematics, “…their every result has a 
counterpart in modern mathematics, even if subsumed in patterns of claims and proofs 
recognized much later…  The Pythagorean theorem lives on in Euclidean and even 
Riemannian metric spaces.”  When we consider the theorems, it may be tempting to 
think that there is little difference between ancient and modern geometry—rather, the 
differences become vivid when we consider the nature of the inferences.  A logical 
reconstruction in the style of Hilbert cannot account for the successes of ancient Greek 
mathematics, because the modern version deploys inferential machinery that was not 
then available, and strips out the inferential practices that constitute proof in that 
context.  Worse, it finds fault where there is none.  For example, there is no need to 
prove that there is a point of intersection where two lines cross, because crossing 
Euclidean lines cannot fail to have a point of intersection.  There is no possibility of a line 
on a Euclidean diagram representing a dense-but-not-continuous set because there are 
no such things in this mathematical practice.16  Rather, lines and their intersections are 
the fundamental Euclidean elements.  They do not represent some other, more fine-
grained level of mathematical reality such as the real numbers as we now conceive of 
them, or any subset thereof.17   
For studies of other, more recent proving practices, this point (traduttore traditore) has 
two consequences.  One is that it explains why mathematicians move problems from 
one domain to another.  A well-chosen translation can make more information 
available, or it might dispose of superfluous information.  It may also change the range 
                                                 
15 Literally, ‘translator, traitor’, meaning that all translation traduces (except that the Italian original has a 
play on words that cannot be reproduced in English).   
16 More precisely, to take the case of I.1, that the circles intersect is co-exact information because it is 
unaffected by bad drawing—however ovoid or tomato-shaped your circles are, in drawing the second 
one, you have to start inside the first, go outside the first in order to pass the other side of the centre of 
the second circle, and then re-enter the first circle again.  This robustness is what rigour means in this 
context.  (Manders 2008a p. 69) 
17 For the historical context of this point, see Ferreirós (2016) chapter eight, and most especially p. 213. 
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of actions available to the mathematician.18  The second consequence is that in 
examining the logic of a proof, we should look at the proof in the form and the idiom in 
which it is used, rather than first translating it into some other idiom.  It may be that the 
proof employs inferential moves that are possible only using precisely that kind of 
representation, governed by precisely those rules.  The Euclidean inferences that 
Manders analyses are possible only by using Euclidean diagrams and following Euclidean 
rules.  Other kinds of inscription governed by other rules support different inferences, 
even if the theorems look similar.   
Fourth, there is in Manders’ analysis no appeal to ineliminable intuition.  We take the 
co-exact information directly from the diagram, by looking at it with selective attention, 
but there is nothing mysterious about this and no reason in principle why it might not 
be automated.  Indeed, Avigad, Dean, and Mumma (2009) have developed a formal 
system based on Manders’ reading of the Elements, though, as the authors note, it does 
not emulate the spatial reasoning in ancient geometry, so the inferences in their system 
are not the inferences in Euclid, even if the results correlate.  Of course, any automation 
of a human proof-practice runs into our third point (traduttore traditore!).  It may be 
that preparing some given proof practice for automation changes it so that the 
inferential actions are no longer recognisable from the original, but this is a matter of 
the detail of the system used and the available technology.  In their paper, Avigad, Dean, 
and Mumma conclude by noting some differences between the Elements and their 
system, and reflecting on what automation would involve in this case.  The general point 
is this: one might think that the rising successes of automated proof finders and 
checkers would present a problem for an approach to proofs rooted in the philosophy of 
(human) mathematical practices.  This is not so.  Manders claims that some proofs 
involve actions on objects other than propositions—there is no reason in principle why 
these actions should not be carried out by machines.19  The diagrams could be drawn in 
dust, or on a computer screen, or stored virtually, and the co-exact information could be 
extracted in any number of ways other than by human sight.  This is why Manders need 
not draw on cognitive science or the psychology of perception in his logical analysis of 
Euclidean inference-making.  The inferential actions in Euclidean diagram-use have to be 
possible for humans, but they need not be performed by humans and their logic does 
not depend on the specifics of human cognition.    
                                                 
18 See Starikova (2010) for a case study on this point.  
19 Interestingly, Alan Weir, developing a defence of formalism against criticism based on the difference 
between real proofs and proof-theoretic derivations, makes a similar point, “I did not require 
that the formal rules of a derivation be what we would recognise as logical rules.”  (2016:30).  He then 
lists all manner of rules for actions that we might count as inferential: “basic rules for differentiation, 
power rules, product rules, quotient rules, the chain rule and so on.”  Both he and we note that 
automation of proofs need not be, and probably cannot be, the encoding of proofs in some version of 
formal logic.  Rather, what is automated is a much wider class of inferential actions, including topic-
specific actions on objects other than propositions (or sentences).  
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Finally (fifth), note that Manders’ argument that proofs in Euclidean geometry make 
essential use of non-textual inferential actions depends on the role in the practice of 
diagrams.  Many of the most plausible candidates for Manders-style case-studies of 
contemporary mathematics appeal to uses of diagrams or other non-textual 
representational means (Cayley diagrams, commutative diagrams, knot diagrams, and 
so on).  This is because the distortion involved in translating a proof into a derivation in 
formal logic is especially clear and salient when the proof includes visual reasoning.  For 
example, Tanswell (2015) chooses the mutilated chessboard problem precisely because 
the visual reasoning is quick and clear, and the corresponding formal proofs (there are 
several quite different versions, so we cannot speak of ‘the’ formalisation of this visual 
argument) are significantly longer and more complicated.  In such cases, the claim that 
the translation is not routine, and that the inferences in the formal derivation really are 
not tidied up versions of the inferences in the visual argument is especially compelling.   
However, as we shall shortly see, not every putative case of non-propositional 
inferential action depends on the use of diagrams.  In some proofs, we seem to work 
directly on the mathematical objects themselves.  Think, for a simple example, of the 
standard proof of the infinity of primes.  Here, the objects of the imperative verbs are 
not diagrams or symbols but rather the numbers themselves (take the members of the 
assumed finite set of primes, form the product, add one, etc.).  In that case, it is easy to 
write the proof down because we have systematic notations for arithmetic—even in 
natural language.  More generally, the vital feature in these cases is not that they are 
visual, or non-propositional, or iconic.  Rather, the feature that prevents non-distorting 
translation into a general logic is the topic-specificity of the inferential moves.  Euclidean 
inferences are possible only within something like Euclidean practice.  Considerations of 
divisibility only arise in domains that share enough structure with the natural numbers 
for the question of whether one element divides another to be meaningful and 
informative (so in a field, for example, it’s meaningful to ask whether one element 
divides another but uninformative because the answer is always ‘yes’).  Mathematical 
induction is available in some domains but not others.  And so on.  Sometimes, these 
topic-specific (or better, non-universal) inferential moves are coded into 
representational systems.  Ordinary high-school algebraic notation, for example, has the 
non-universal move of multiplying out brackets coded in.  The non-universality of the 
moves available in some notational or diagrammatic practice is what matters for this 
argument.  This is what Euclidean diagram-use has in common with other inferential 
practices that resist translation into formal logic, whether they employ diagrams or 
not.20   
In terms of Feferman’s formalizability thesis, we can read Manders’ work as unearthing 
the ‘underlying structure’ of Euclidean plane proofs.  His analysis shows that it is 
possible in at least one case to affirm our version of part i) of Feferman’s formalizability 
                                                 
20 I make this argument in greater detail in Larvor (2012a). 
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thesis while denying parts ii) and iii).  What we take from Manders for application 
elsewhere are our three criteria.   
The first, (a) is that mental models must be externalisable as diagrams (or in some other 
publicly sharable way such as physical or computer models).  At its core, this is just the 
requirement that proofs should be available for public scrutiny.  We focus here on two-
dimentionsal diagrams because they have been central to mathematical practice for 
most of the history of mathematics, but there is nothing essential about this.  Some 
early modern editions of Euclid were pop-up books with fold-out models of polyhedra, 
and digital technologies now offer all sorts of new possibilities in this respect.  All that 
matters is that the representations should be available for public examination.  
Moreover, it is advantageous if they are open to easy manipulation and 
(re)construction.  This explains the continuing popularity of chalk and white boards 
among mathematicians.  By ‘easy’ here, we mean only that there should be no 
requirement that mathematicians should be especially good at drawing or making paper 
models.  What may not always be easy is working out what to draw in order to 
represent the mathematics effectively.21   
The second criterion (b) is that the information gained from such diagrams should not 
be metric (so that the inferences are not vulnerable to local deformations22).  This is a 
wider notion than Manders’ co-exactness, which he devised for the specific case of 
Euclid.  For example, the fact that a minimal tree of a planar graph has one more vertex 
than it has edges is a non-metric feature that one might see from a diagram, but it falls 
outside Manders’ notion of co-exactness.  Similarly, subitising small numerosities and 
spotting patterns in dots are not vulnerable to local deformation, but are not co-exact in 
Manders’ sense.23   
Finally, (c) it should be possible to relate the diagrammatic inferences in some 
systematic way to other mathematical proof-practices.24  This condition is Manders’ 
observation about conceptual agility, put to a new purpose.  He presents it as a 
challenge for philosophers; here we offer it as a criterion of good order for 
mathematical practices.  What Manders shows in his unpublished paper is how 
Descartes was able to relate Euclidean diagrammatic practice systematically to symbolic 
algebra.  Such connections are only possible with stable, orderly, rule-governed 
representational practices.  Contemporary mathematics is rich in such connections, so 
much so that a single proof might contain many different inferential practices expressed 
                                                 
21 I am grateful to Robert Thomas for this distinction, and for pointing out my arbitrary restriction to two-
dimensional representations.   
22 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this way of putting the point.   
23 Silvia De Toffoli, in an unpublished presentation, has taken some steps towards classifying diagrams 
that can support inferences.  Her principal criterion is the Jordan curve theorem.  On the significance of 
the Jordan Curve theorem for reasoning with pictures, see also Corfield 2003 p. 257.   
24 This criterion was originally inspired by some remarks in De Toffoli and Giardino (2014) about the 
connections between knot diagrams and other notations.   
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in different mathematical idioms.  Moving between such diverse practices is the 
‘conceptual agility’ that Manders’ mentions in his unpublished paper.  He is not the only 
philosopher to remark on the importance of moving between mathematical practices; 
José Ferreirós makes this the theme and title of his recent book (2016).  For Ferreirós, it 
is the interplay between mathematical practices that gives mathematics its stability, 
order and meaning.  It is only by considering this interplay that the ‘naturalness’ of 
structures like the natural numbers can be undersood.  Similarly, Emily Grosholz argues 
that mathematicians typically require a ‘consortium of modes of representation’ (2007 
p. 235) in order to make mathematical sense.  She offers many examples from advanced 
mathematics in her final chapter, but one of the simpler ones will give the flavour.  She 
cites a textbook on topology and geometry, and notes that the authors illustrate the 
concept of the Cartesian product of two sets with the Euclidean25 plane, which they 
characterise both as ℝ X ℝ and with the aid of a diagram.  According to Grosholz, the 
diagram is there because the Euclidean plane is a ‘canonical object’ that will appear 
later in the textbook, and as such it is not merely the product of the set of reals with 
itself.  Rather, it is this product treated as a vector space with a natural inner product 
that induces a norm, which makes it a metric space and ultimately a topological space.  
The diagram is there to help make sense of the algebraic and topological definitions that 
would otherwise be arbitrary and perhaps even unintelligible.   
Ferreirós and Grosholz show (in different ways, within different philosophical research 
programmes) that contemporary mathematics is a ramifying web of interrelated (or in 
Ferreirós’ terms, interplaying) practices and modes of representation.  This is 
characteristic of mathematics—the suggestion here is to make this feature into part of a 
criterion of mathematical practice in good order.   For a trivial example, multiplication 
with sticks (so-called ‘Japanese multiplication’) can be shown to work by relating it to 
other multiplication procedures in other modes of representation (such as long 
multiplication using Hindu-Arabic numerals).  For a historical example of this criterion at 
work, consider the Argand diagram.  Until Argand published his paper, calculating with 
imaginary numbers was a mathematical practice in dubious standing.  The Argand 
diagram made imaginary numbers respectable by relating the practices involving them 
to another part of mathematics that was known to be in good order, namely, algebraic 
geometry.  Nowadays, it is more often the other way around: a diagrammatic practice 
gains respectability by standing in a systematic mathematical relation with non-
diagrammatic mathematics.  For example, consider Cayley graphs of finitely generated 
groups.  These diagrams might, in some alternative history of mathematics, have been a 
free-standing bit of mathematical practice.  One can imagine a community of 
mathematicians who thought about groups entirely in terms of and by means of Cayley 
graphs.  However, this would be an impoverished practice with no way of deciding those 
questions about finitely generated groups that cannot be settled by inspecting and 
manipulating Cayley graphs.  It is precisely because we have notations and inferential 
                                                 
25 ‘Euclidean’ in a modern topology textbook does not mean, of couse, what it means when we discuss 
Euclid’s Elements.   
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practices for algebraic group theory and for graph theory, that Cayley graphs are 
definitely part of mathematics (otherwise they might have been on the margin of 
mathematics, like chess-problems) and both useful and interesting.  For a trivial 
example, on a Cayley graph it is very easy to see whether the group is commutative, but 
communtativity is a question that arises naturally with the use of algebraic notation.   
What has already been done?  Case studies of recent mathematics 
Having sketched Manders’ analysis of Euclidean diagrammatic inferential practice and 
drawn our three criteria out of it, the next task is to look for existing attempts to extend 
it to present-day mathematics, or otherwise to look for philosophical analyses of 
mathematical proof that seem to be in a similar line.  Direct citation of Manders’ articles 
is, unsurprisingly, dominated by discussions of ancient Greek geometry.  Notably, there 
are in print no attempts to refute his analysis of the logic of Euclidean plane geometry.  
The experts seem to be convinced by it, and this is a further reason for choosing it as a 
model for analysis of recent mathematics.  Otherwise, his work is mentioned in 
scholarship on Kant’s account of space, work on visual reasoning in general and 
discussions of Avigad, Dean, and Mumma (2009).  There are not many candidates for 
the role specified, namely, Manders-style analyses of mathematical proof-practices from 
this or the previous century.  Significant exceptions are De Toffoli & Giardino (2013, 
2014, and 2016) and Leitgeb (2009).26  These do not explicitly pick up Manders’ 
framework with the intention of turning it into a programme.  However, they do take up 
similar lines regarding the logic(s) of mathematical proof(s) and they are informed by his 
work.   
De Toffoli & Giardino  
De Toffoli & Giardino argue by cases that in knot-theory and low-dimensional topology, 
we meet examples of inferential practices that ineliminably involve non-propositional 
representations, that are accepted as proofs by the relevant expert communities and 
that are rigorous because they impose precise constraints on what moves are 
permissible.  In their most recent paper (2016), they present Alexander’s (1923) proof 
that every knot can be represented (not uniquely) as a closed braid (p. 40).  They explain 
the significance of this by presenting the braid groups and some examples of reasoning 
using braid diagrams.  Since Alexander published his proof in the 1920s, it (narrowly) 
meets our requirement for cases dating to after the emergence of the contemporary 
foundational language(s) and logical apparatus(es).    
The usual proof of Alexander’s theorem relies on our ability to imagine manipulating 
rope.  It invites us to imagine a knot lying spread on a plane surface (though not in a 
                                                 
26 And Starikova (2010).  Her work on geometric group theory is in the same line but raises problems that 
lie beyond the scope of this paper.   
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plane because there are crossings where the rope passes over itself).27  The core of the 
proof is to show that every knot can be given an axis.  An axis is a line perpendicular to 
the plane of the knot but not intersecting the knot itself, such that an ant walking along 
the length of the rope-loop would always go round the axis in the same direction, either 
clockwise or anticlockwise.  This is not the case for any arbitrary knot, but it is easy to 
see that it is always possible to transform an arbitrary knot in such a way that it gets an 
axis without changing its character as a knot.28  This is done by successively moving 
sections of the knot from one side of the chosen point to the other, either simply by 
sliding or by flipping.  Once we have transformed our knot in such a way that it has an 
axis, then we can turn it into a braid by cutting along a straight line in the plane starting 
at the axial point.  De Toffoli & Giardino claim that “the reasoning involved in this 
specific proof cannot be identified exclusively with propositional reasoning, and even 
less with formal reasoning.”  (p. 43).  Rather (to impose Manders’ language on De Toffoli 
& Giardino) it is a “rigorous demonstrative use of non-propositional representation”.  
They report that this is not a mere illustration—this invitation to imagine handling rope 
is essential to the proof.  What is more, they claim that this is not a solitary case; rather 
proofs of this sort constitute a stable inferential practice with strict rules shared among 
a community of experts.  They emphasise the dynamic character of the proof—it does 
not invite us to look at a diagram, but rather to imagine shifting and flipping sections of 
rope.  Indeed, they point out that “The original proof contains no pictures.” (p. 40).  It 
relies on what they call a “cognitive capacity [of] manipulative imagination” (ibid.).29    
In the previous section, we identified five features of Euclidean diagram-use as analysed 
by Manders.  What happens if we look for these features in Alexander’s proof as 
presented by De Toffoli & Giardino?  The first three points transfer easily.  The proof 
involves text as well as exercises of manipulative imagination—most notably, it includes 
imperatives as well as propositions (first point).  The imagined manipulations are 
inferential actions (second point).  It is certainly the case that a translation of this proof 
into a formal idiom would change it out of all recognition—the inferential actions 
involved in a formal version would be different actions on different objects (third point).  
The actions possible on strings of symbols are quite different from the actions possible 
on string.   
Our fourth claim about Euclidean diagram-use is that there is in Manders’ analysis no 
appeal to ineliminable intuition.  Is this true in the case of Alexander’s proof, as written 
up by De Toffoli & Giardino?  The vital word here is ‘ineliminable’.  There is no doubt 
that the proof as presented relies on our spatial intuition.  We could try to dispose of 
the appeal to inner intuition by replacing the mental rope with physical rope.  Then, it 
seems that there is no slide into psychologism and the rules of the practice are easy to 
                                                 
27 A ‘knot’ here is a closed loop, which may be tangled, such as the trefoil knot.  None of the useful knots 
known to sailors and fishermen are ‘knots’ for this purpose.   
28 That is, its ambient isotopy class.  
29 See Giardino (2017) for a further elaboration of this notion.   
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specify: the permitted actions in rearranging a physical knot to give it an axis are those 
that do not damage the rope.  The difficulty lies in the leap to generality.  The claim of 
this theorem is that any knot can be so rearranged, and we do not have—De Toffoli & 
Giardino do not give us—an account of the logical process by which manipulating some 
ropes, either in thought or in the hand, proves that it is always possible to rearrange any 
knot around an axis.  They simply report that “it is left to our intuition to prove that this 
transformation [into a knot with an axis] is always possible and is not an infinite 
process” (p. 44).  This is remarkable given that by 1923, it was well understood that 
spatial intuition is not generally reliable.  Yet, Alexander had no qualms about relying on 
it in this proof.  The justification of a general result, remember, was one of the central 
questions about Euclidean diagrams: how do operations on a specific diagram prove a 
theorem about all diagrams of this sort?  Manders goes to the trouble of distinguishing 
exact from co-exact information and working through the details of case-distinctions 
(and more) because it does not suffice to say that the Euclidean geometer sees the truth 
of the theorem in virtue of his or her spatial intuition.  The traditional (that is, mid-
twentieth century) view of diagrammatic arguments was that they are unreliable as 
proofs precisely because they depend on spatial intuition (which familiar problem-cases 
show to be unreliable).  Manders seeks to refute the traditional, disparaging view of 
diagrammatic proof (at least as regards Euclidean plane geometry) precisely by 
removing the appeal to unanalysed spatial intuition from his logical account of how this 
activity constitutes mathematical proof.   
In this connection, it may matter that rather than speak of shifting and flipping, 
Alexander gives a rule for dividing the rope up into straight sections and replacing each 
problematic section with a pair of connected straight edges so that the axis falls within 
the triangle of these three lines (this move is called an ‘elementary isotopy’).  These two 
operations (making triangles and shifting + flipping) are mathematically equivalent, but 
dealing solely with straight edges constrains the possible moves.  Recall our contrast 
between constructions and manipulations; Alexander’s procedure is a construction 
followed by a deletion, so it is closer to Euclid than is De Toffoli & Giardino’s version of 
his proof.  It is also much easier to externalise as a drawing (though shifting and flipping 
makes a better video).   
The last of our five points about the Euclidean diagram was to ask whether every case of 
non-propositional inferential action depends on the use of a non-textual representation 
of mathematical content.  In this case, we noted that Alexander’s paper did not include 
a diagram.  De Toffoli & Giardino describe the proof as a manipulation of a ‘mental 
model’ (picking up Thurston’s phrase, p. 44).  To ask what mental models are and how 
they work would be to wade into the debates in philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science which are beyond the scope of this paper.  Besides, we just argued that the 
reference to mental models need not indicate a problematic psychologism in this case 
because the mental model can be replaced by diagrams.  This marks an important 
feature of this area: the ‘knots’ are closed loops with finitely many tangles, so it is 
always possible in principle to make a diagram (though not always easy).  In other 
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words, the mathematician can externalise the mental model as a drawing without 
changing the proof (because the same actions are now performed on the diagram rather 
than the mental representation).  De Toffoli & Giardino note that, “The practice of 
proving that is common in this branch of mathematics is in fact quite distant from that 
of almost every area because it largely relies on ‘seeing’ topological objects, which 
amounts to envisaging transformations on the representations available for them.” 
(p. 45).  The finitude of the knots is one of the reasons for that distinctness.   
On the other hand, the proofs rely on the fact that human spatial intuition is a good 
judge of the topology of relatively simple finite structures, and such judgments are 
found elsewhere in mathematics.  It is the topology of the Euclidean diagram that 
represents the co-exact information.  In a rather more recent example, simple 
topological objects are used for calculations in higher dimensional algebra.30  It’s 
notable that spatial intuition is much more important in this paper (2016) than in their 
(2014), because the earlier paper focussed on the usefulness of knot-diagrams, and how 
these can be used inferentially using (for example) colourability or by using Wirtinger 
presentations to associate diagrammatic argument with algebra.31     
Thinking about the use of diagrams in mathematical inferences leads to the use of 
imagination, partly because the use of diagrams requires some work of the 
imagination—one might imagine part of the diagram moving or growing or shrinking, for 
example.  One may have to imagine the diagram drawn more precisely than it is in fact.  
In any case, mathematicians do not always bother to draw the pictures that they have in 
mind (as in the case Alexander’s proof).  Reflection on the contrast between De Toffoli & 
Giardino’s papers of 2014 and 2016 suggests the following: where mathematicians and 
others talk of ‘mental models’, they are really talking about internalised diagrammatic 
practices (just as reliable mental arithmetic is internalised pencil-and-paper 
arithmetic).32  If that is right, then in order to show that a proof that seems to appeal to 
a mental model is in good logical order, we have to identify the corresponding 
diagrammatic practice, show that criteria a-c are true of it and then carry out a 
Manders-style analysis.  To explore this thought, we turn now to a philosopher and 
mathematician who explicitly defends the use of mental models in proofs. 
                                                 
30 See Corfield (2003) chapter 10.4.  I am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing this to my 
attention.   
31 This point, about the relationship between knot-diagrams and other, more discursive sorts of 
representation, was the the inspiration for our criterion c). 
32 As we saw with Euclid, another way of examining the role of intuition in a proof is to try to code it into 
a computer.  There is at present no known way of doing this with Alexander’s proof.  Movies are another 
option.  Some of the illustrations in De Toffoli & Giardino (2016) are stills from an animation by Ester 
Dalvit.    
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Leitgeb 
In his (2009), Hannes Leitgeb aims to rehabilitate Gödel’s claims that (some) 
mathematical laws, axioms and propositions can be in some sense perceived to be true 
(p. 275).  In preparing the ground for this, he argues for a distinction between formal 
and informal proofs.  He emphasises the arbitrariness of the conventions required to 
reconstruct a piece of informal mathematics in a formal system.  In particular, he 
suggests that the mathematical content of a proof does not usually fix the order of the 
logical system (p. 269) required for its reconstruction.33  He goes on to make some 
further points that have become familiar in the literature regarding the differences 
between formal and informal proofs: mathematicians read mathematical notations and 
representations as meaningful (rather than syntactically, as symbol-strings in 
derivations), and they regard theorems as true (rather than ‘true’ or true-in-X).  Insofar 
as mathematical practice involves axioms, the axioms do not play the roles that they 
play in logic textbooks.  Even regarding the axioms of set theory, Leitgeb says that 
“…group theorists, topologists, and probability theorists usually do not even know these 
set-theoretic axioms—the set theory they use is likely a version of naïve set theory—and 
it is not conceptually essential to their proofs that they rely on an axiomatic system of 
set theory.”34  (p. 271).  In short, Leitgeb is on the same page as the mathematicians and 
philosophers we canvassed at the outset in footnotes 2 and 3.  Note that substantiating 
the last part of this claim (“it is not conceptually essential to their proofs that they rely 
on an axiomatic system of set theory”) would require a logical—Leitgeb might prefer to 
say ‘conceptual’—analysis of the informal proofs in question, in which axiomatic set 
theory did not play an essential role.  Here again, we meet a view about proofs in 
mathematical practice waiting for someone to carry out work corresponding to 
Manders’ reconstruction of Euclidean proof-practice.   
With these motivating considerations in place, Leitgeb distinguishes (what he calls) the 
semantic and intuitive components of proofs.  By ‘semantic’, he means the combination 
and manipulation of meaningful propositions.  By ‘intuition’, he means “manipulating 
and inspecting the mental constructions that are similar to [the relevant mathematical] 
structures” (p. 278).  He offers two examples of such mental constructions.  The first is a 
mental representation of an unlabelled graph.  Rather helpfully for the present 
argument, Leitgeb claims that we can understand his mental representation by 
contemplating this picture: 
                                                 
33 Tanswell (2015) makes a similar argument, that informal proofs underdetermine the details of their 
formal reconstructions so radically that the former cannot be meaningfully identified with the latter.  
34 (p. 271).  Leitgeb offers no empirical grounds for these claims about what mathematicians do or do not 
know.  At present it is normal in the philosophy of mathematical practice to make remarks of this sort on 
the basis of one’s standing as a mathematician or acquaintance with mathematicians.  Therefore, this is 
not a complaint about Leitgeb, but rather a point about the state of the sub-field.  Besides, other 
published versions of this claim (by, for example, Kreisel) have not provoked rebukes or rebuttals from 
other mathematicians.   
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The corresponding mental construction is more faithful than this diagram to the 
mathematical structure it represents, because the printed version necessarily has a lot 
of extraneous features (length, thickness and shape of edges, size of nodes, colour, etc.) 
that the mental construction can do without.  His second example is an unlabelled graph 
with the structure of the natural numbers:  
again, we are to think of a mental construction that resembles this diagram but is more 
faithful to the mathematical object it represents (according to Leitgeb, the mental 
model is not a copy of this picture before the mind’s eye but is rather the fixed point of 
the operation of chopping the leftmost node off pictures like this).  His suggestion, then, 
is that proving theorems includes inspection and manipulation of such mental 
constructions.  In other words, Leitgeb suggests that proving (sometimes) involves 
inferential actions (including inspection) on objects other than propositions.  Such 
actions are likely to take place at the points in a proof where a strictly propositional 
analysis would suggest that there is a logical gap or an implicit appeal to an axiom.  
What fills the gap or does the work of the axiom, according to Leitgeb, is intuitive (that 
is, quasi-perceptual) access to a mental construction.  This seems very similar to the 
appeal to mental models that we encountered in De Toffoli & Giardino, except that they 
emphasise the dynamics aspect (the ‘manipulative imagination’) whereas Leitgeb, 
guided by Gödel’s perceptual language, emphasises inspection over manipulation.   
It bears repeating that all these writers, Leitgeb, De Toffoli and Giardino (and certainly 
Gödel) are well aware of the history of logic and mathematics, and of the fall from grace 
of spatial intuition and diagrammatic reasoning.  They know the received view of visual 
reasoning in mathematics.  They also know that logic is distinct from psychology.   
Nevertheless, attention to practice drives them to claim that mental models have a role 
in the making and checking of proofs.  If they are on to something then it must be 
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possible to explain how such proofs are sharable35 and rigorous.  The ambition of our 
conditions a-c is to offer a framework for such explanations.   
Unfortunately, Leitgeb’s discussion does not include any examples of proofs that 
depend on the sorts of intuitive access to mental constructions that he describes.  What 
his paper omits (perhaps because it originates in a discussion of Gödel) is the thought 
that the choice of picture depends on what one is trying to prove as well as on the 
mathematical object that the proof is about.  For example, one might think of the 
natural numbers like this:  
 
                                                 
35 Accounts of meaning that ground the intelligibility of speech and thought in social practice (such as 
Wittgenstein’s anti-private language argument or Vygotsky’s social-developmental theory) might suggest 
stronger versions of point (a).  
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Or like this:  
 
Thinking of the appropriate spatial representation of the relevant mathematical 
structure is a practical skill that does not appear in Leitgeb’s discussion.   
Infinite diagrams 
So far, the only proof we have examined in detail is Alexander’s, and this is from a field 
that (as we noted) is concerned with finite knots and braids.  Much of mathematics 
concerns infinite structures, so to be philosophically interesting, our approach has to 
explain how access to a mental construction (which, being in a human mind, is 
presumably finite) allows us to prove theorems about infinite structures.  Leitgeb takes 
a step in this direction, in that his second figure and the instructions on how to read it 
are supposed to make plausible his claim that we can inwardly intuit truths about the 
natural numbers.  However, his paper does not include any sample proofs.  This matters, 
because as noted, the choice of representation is likely to depend on what one is trying 
to prove.  The arrangement of dots at the end of the last section gives the formula for 
the sum of natural numbers up to some n more or less at a glance, for someone who has 
been inducted into the relevant mathematical practices.  On the other hand, one might 
entertain something like Leitgeb’s image while thinking about the Peano axioms.  The 
dot-proof of the sum of whole numbers formula satisfies our conditions a-c: it is very 
easy to draw, it does not exhibit metrical information (it is not sensitive to local 
deformation), and it can be easily related to general arithmetic.  We can easily move 
between dot diagrams and algebraic notation.  It is an example of why we had to 
expand Manders’ ‘co-exact’ into ‘non-metrical’ in formulating b).  It also illustrates one 
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way that a finite diagram can prove a result about an infinite structure.  The dot-
diagram in this case is a rectangle n by n+1 with some device to divide it into two 
‘staircases’ from 1 to n.  Anyone who understands it can see that it does not depend on 
the choice of n.   
This is a rudimentary example from ancient mathematics.  In the paper already cited, 
Feferman (2012) offers three cases from modern mathematics: the Cantor-Bernstein 
theorem, the strong amalgamation theorem and the exact sequence of homology 
theorem.  Feferman’s claim with respect to these cases is psychological rather than 
logical, namely, that it is humanly impossible to understand what these proofs are about 
without the help of their respective diagrams.  This is altogether plausible, but it 
concerns the understanding of the mathematician rather than the logic of the proof.  He 
does not provide the logical analysis36 of the diagram-use that we need—but it is 
noteworthy that in his three cases, points a-c hold.  What is, in Feferman, an account of 
how diagrams drawn on finite materials can permit understanding of theorems about 
infinite structures, can convert into an account of how such diagrams figure in the 
logic(s) of the proofs.  In all of Feferman’s cases, the iterative nature of the generative 
processes mean that it suffices to contemplate a finite section of the infinite structure in 
order to see what happens to the whole.   
Conclusion 
We began by considering Feferman’s three-part formalisability thesis.  Much literature 
in the philosophy of mathematical practice argues, effectively, for keeping a version of 
Feferman’s i) with a suitably modified reading of ‘logical’ while denying his ii) and iii).   
This requires some alternative to the derivation-based analysis of the arguments in 
proofs.  Ken Manders ‘The Euclidean Diagram’ offers a case in that fulfils this 
requirement.  In this case,   
a) the diagrams are easy to draw and work on (they require no special skill in 
draughtsmanship);  
b) the information thus displayed is not metrical; and  
c) it is possible to put the inferences into systematic mathematical relation with 
other mathematical inferential practices 
We claim that these are characteristic features of a diagrammatic practice in good 
order.  The first two are related, in that the robustness of a diagrammatic practice to 
local deformation is the reason why it does not demand any special skill with pen, chalk 
or pointed stick.  The third feature is most meaningful in cases like Euclidean geometry 
or knot theory where the diagrammatic practice came first.  It offers a criterion for 
assessing a newly-invented diagram use, such as might be sketched on a napkin or 
                                                 
36 Indeed, Feferman had no motive to provide such an analysis, because he thought that the underlying 
logical structure of every good proof is given by a derivation.  His chief argument for this seems to be that 
otherwise, formal logic would lose its importance for philosophy of mathematics (2012:384-385).    
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blackboard.  It comes for free in cases where the diagram is a useful representation of 
already developed mathematics, and is usually trivial in published proofs.  This is the 
case with the examples from higher dimensional algebra that David Corfield presents in 
section 10.4 of his (2003).  In these cases, there is no need for a Manders-style analysis 
to show why the diagrammatic practice is rigorous, because it was designed to capture 
the rules of an already developed body of mathematics.  Similarly, the inferential use of 
commutative diagrams, explored in De Toffoli (2017), obviously satisfies a) and c).  In 
such cases, it is b) that offers insight into how they work.   
In search of a Manders-style treatment of cases in contemporary mathematics, we 
considered papers by De Toffoli & Giardino.  These detailed and valuable studies make 
reference to spatial intuition and the examination and manipulation of mental models in 
their analyses of some proofs.  This presents a difficulty, if we wish to offer a satisfying 
logical account of how these proofs work.  However, reflection on these cases and work 
by Leitgeb and Feferman suggests that we can read such references to intuition and 
mental models as invitations to reconstruct an implied diagrammatic practice.  Our 
three conditions above can then serve as success criteria for such a reconstruction.  If a 
proof that appeals to mental models can be reconstructed diagrammatically such that it 
satisfies these three points, then its rigour can be analysed and evaluated.  It may still be 
invalid, but the question of its validity or invalidity will not turn on unsharable inner 
intuitions.   
In the philosophy of mathematical practice, it is important to pursue the analysis at an 
appropriate level of generality.  With too narrow a focus, one passes from philosophy 
into history or journalism; too broad, and one loses touch with the variety (what 
Wittgentein called the ‘motley’) of proof practices.  Here we concern ourselves only 
with proofs that involve diagrams, explicitly or implicity.  Nevertheless, some of the 
ideas in play have wider application.  As we saw, criterion c) is not restricted to 
diagrammatic practices, but is true of modern mathematics generally and can serve as a 
test for any putative mathematical practice.  I have argued elsewhere37 that 
diagrammatic practices are just one kind of topic-specific inferential action—there are 
plenty of others.  However, focussing on diagrammatic practices has the merit of 
bringing criteria a) and b) into view.   
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Larvor (2012a) 
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